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ABSTRACT 
 
The nearly twenty-year history of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s 
safe harbor provisions has been marked by criticism from content owners, 
online service providers, and end users. Content owners complain about the 
cost of monitoring online content and sending takedown notices. Online 
service providers complain about the cost of receiving and processing the 
notices. And end users complain about their legitimate use of copyrighted 
works being subject to DMCA takedown. Colleges and universities have 
been at the forefront of this controversy; as providers of online services to 
their students, they have been a focus of both Congress and copyright 
owners.  Higher education therefore provides a fitting case study of the 
effect of the safe harbor provisions, and particularly the nature, volume, 
and cost of the notice-and-takedown system. 
 
This Article presents the results of a survey of colleges and universities 
regarding their copyright and DMCA practices. The results expose 
infirmities in the administration of the DMCA system, both within the world 
of higher education and within the U.S. Copyright Office. Additionally, the 
results suggest that colleges and universities need to take better advantage 
of the safe harbors and correct certain fundamental misunderstandings of 
important and essential aspects of the DMCA. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  As access to the Internet became more widespread in the early 
1990s, questions arose as to the legal liability of online access providers 
whose customers used that access to infringe copyright. For example, early 
cases such as Playboy Enterprises v. Frena1 and Religious Technology 
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services2 examined whether the 
operators of electronic bulletin board services were liable under copyright 
law when their subscribers posted infringing material on the bulletin boards. 
 
[2]  The need for nationwide uniformity on this issue, combined with the 
failure of courts to coalesce around a single liability standard, eventually 
led Congress to enact Title II of the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
of 1998 (the DMCA).3 Title II of the DMCA established four “safe 
harbors,” codified in 17 U.S.C. § 512—four categories of conduct for which 
online service providers (OSPs) are not held liable for infringement 
damages.4 The covered conduct includes routing or acting as a conduit for 
                                               
*The authors are Professors of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law, where 
Professor Cotropia is also Director of the Intellectual Property Institute. They would like 
to thank the many individuals who helped with this study: Paul Birch, Kenny Crews, Linda 
Fairtile, Casey Fiesler, Lolly Gasaway, Deborah Gerhardt, Corinna Lain, Lucretia 
McCulley, Shannon Sinclair, Roger Skalbeck, Brad Stringfellow, Scott Tilghman, and Rob 
Tyler. We are also grateful to the Chicago-Kent Center for Empirical Studies for providing 
a grant in support of the study. 
 
1 See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
 
2 See Religious Tech. Cent. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 
1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 
3 The official name of Title II was the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation 
Act. In practice, however, its provisions are usually referred to as the DMCA—
notwithstanding that the DMCA contained four other titles unrelated to liability of online 
service providers. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SUMMARY OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM 
COPY RIGHT ACT OF 1998 (1998), https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8SHW-GPU2]. 
 
4 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877–
81 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012)) (describing the safe harbor requirements 
for transmission, caching, storage, and information location tools). To qualify for any of 
the safe harbors, an OSP would have conform to various related requirements. See id. For 
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Transitory Communications,5 making local Cache Copies,6 offering online 
System Storage locations where information can reside (e.g., websites),7 
and providing Information Location services (e.g., search engines).8 
 
[3]  The most well-known and controversial aspect of the DMCA’s safe 
harbor system involves what is known as “notice and takedown.” In order 
to qualify for three of the four safe harbors, an OSP must designate an agent 
to receive notices from copyright owners regarding alleged infringement 
taking place using the OSP’s system.9 When the agent receives a compliant 
notice, the OSP must act expeditiously to remove access to the allegedly 
infringing material. Otherwise, it loses the protection of the safe harbor.10 
                                               
example, the OSP must adopt, reasonably implement, and publicize a policy that provides 
for the termination of subscribers and account holders who repeatedly infringe copyright. 
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2012). 
 
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
 
6 See id. § 512(b). 
 
7 See id. § 512(c). 
 
8 See id. § 512(d). 
 
9 The lone exception is the Transitory Communications safe harbor in 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) 
(2010). The System Storage safe harbor explicitly requires agent registration. See id. 
§ 512(c)(2). The other two safe harbors implicitly require it by incorporating a notice-and-
takedown process similar to that found in section 512(c). See id. § 512(b)(2)(E), 512(d)(3). 
And it is clear that without timely registration of an agent, the protections are unavailable. 
See BWP Media USA, Inc. v. Hollywood Fan Sites, L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 3d 397, 400 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“A service provider cannot retroactively qualify for the safe harbor for 
infringements occurring before the proper designation of an agent under the statute.”); 
CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 697 n.4 (D. Md. 2001) (holding 
that the section 512(c) safe harbor is only available to an OSP after it designates a DMCA 
agent), aff’d, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Oppenheimer v. Allvoices, Inc., No. C 14-
00499 LB, 2014 WL 2604033, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2014) (holding that an OSP “may 
not invoke the safe harbor found in Section 512(c)(1) with respect to infringing conduct 
that occurred prior to [its] designating a DMCA-related agent with the Copyright Office”). 
 
10 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2018); see also id. § 512(d)(3). Note that losing the 
protection of the safe harbor simply means the loss of an otherwise available defense 
against an infringement claim. It does not necessarily mean that the OSP is liable; the 
rightsholder would still have to prove its case in court.  
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[4]  In the nearly twenty years since the DMCA was enacted, the notice-
and-takedown system has been marked by criticism from content owners, 
online providers, and end users. Content owners complain about cost of 
monitoring online content and sending takedown notices.11 Online service 
providers complain about the cost of receiving and responding to the 
notices.12 And end users complain about legitimate use of copyrighted 
works being subject to DMCA takedown.13 
 
[5]  Criticism of the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown system has had 
particular resonance among institutions of higher education. Colleges and 
universities, along with other educational institutions, have long occupied a 
unique place in copyright law. The Copyright Act contains many provisions 
that recognize the role that educational values play in encouraging the 
creation and dissemination of creative works.14 Even the DMCA itself 
relieves institutions of higher education of liability for certain infringing 
activities in which their students and faculty engage.15 
 
[6]  The core of the notice-and-takedown system, however, applies to 
colleges and universities in the same way that it applies to other OSPs. This 
is the case despite the fact that colleges and universities are situated 
                                               
11 See, e.g., Music Community Written Submission Regarding Development of the Joint 
Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement, in response to Request of the U.S. 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator for Public Comments, 80 Fed. Reg. 52800 
(Oct. 15, 2015), App. C, at 1–2, http://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Music-
Community-Submission-in-re-DMCA-512-FINAL-7559445.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K8U-
UGKY ] (referring to “unprecedented burden” of takedown system and “mismatch between 
the amount of infringement and the burden of enforcement”). 
 
12 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or Chilling Effects - 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA 
CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 684 (2006) (reporting on high cost of compliance for large 
ISPs). 
 
13 See id. at 666–78 (detailing flaws in notices). 
 
14 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (giving teaching and research special status in fair use 
inquiry); id. § 110(2) (exempting nonprofit educational institutions from certain forms of 
liability); id. § 112(f) (exempting the use of copies or phonorecords of work that is in digital 
form for nonprofit educational institutions).  
 
15 See id. § 512(e) (including public institutions). 
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somewhat differently. Like other OSPs, they often provide Internet access 
and storage. But unlike other OSPs, their users are not customers culled 
from the marketplace or random, unconnected users; instead, most of their 
users are students to whom the institution is arguably in loco parentis, such 
that it might exercise more authority over their conduct and treat encounters 
with copyright law as teaching moments.16 
 
[7]  Colleges and universities accordingly have unique responsibilities 
toward those who use their networks to infringe copyright, over and above 
the responsibilities that the DMCA imposes on all OSPs. These extra 
responsibilities emerge from the institutions’ core educational mission, 
which presumably includes using encounters with the legal system as 
teaching moments. These institutions would want to ensure that their 
response to notices is consistent with their broader mission of education and 
knowledge creation. Extra responsibilities are also imposed from outside 
the institutions, most notably in the 2008 Higher Education Opportunity 
Act, which requires colleges and universities (1) to annually disclose to 
students the criminal and civil penalties that attach to copyright 
infringement and the steps that the institution takes to address 
infringement,17 (2) to use technology-based deterrents to combat copyright 
infringement, and (3) to explore lawful alternatives to illegal file-sharing.18 
 
[8]  Against this backdrop of regulation, colleges and universities must 
design and implement policies to deal with DMCA takedown notices while 
remaining faithful to their other responsibilities, both legal and educational. 
To date, there has been no empirical study of how colleges and universities 
have navigated this task. There have been some broader empirical studies 
of DMCA notice-and-takedown—examples include Urban and Quilter,19 
                                               
16 For an explanation and historical examination of the in loco parentis concept, see Philip 
Lee, The Curious Life of In Loco Parentis in American Universities, 8 HIGHER EDUC. IN 
REV. 65 (2011). 
 
17 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(P) (2018). 
 
18 See id. § 1094(a)(29). See infra Part III.B.4 & Table 7 (reporting on use of such specific 
technology-based deterrents as firewalls, bandwidth-throttling, and blacklists).  
 
19 See generally Urban & Quilter, supra note 12 (discussing the takedown of material 
posted online after a copyright-holder provides notice).  
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Seng,20 and Urban, Karaganis, and Schofield.21—but none of them focused 
on the challenges of the higher education environment. 
 
[9]  This Article fills that gap by disclosing the results of a two-stage 
empirical study.22 The study first gathers and analyzes U.S. Copyright 
Office data to show that a high number of institutions of higher education 
have failed to take advantage of the DMCA’s safe harbors at all.23 It then 
reports on a survey of those institutions that have availed themselves of the 
DMCA’s protections—a survey that reveals fundamental 
misunderstandings of important and essential aspects of the DMCA. We 
conclude with observations about the likely reasons for the study’s 
surprising findings and with recommendations for ways to improve the 
administration of the DMCA system, not only within higher education, but 
also within the U.S. Copyright Office and within the world of service 
providers more broadly. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20 See generally Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of 
DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 369 (2014) (investigating the takedown 
process). 
 
21 See JENNIFER M. URBAN, JOE KARAGANIS & BRIANNA L. SCHOFIELD, NOTICE AND 
TAKEDOWN IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE 3 (2016); see also THE TAKEDOWN PROJECT, 
http://takedownproject.org [https://perma.cc/H3LM-HS2V] (collecting further data on 
notice-and-takedown and publicizing related research). 
 
22 Note that the study was originally undertaken and its results submitted in response to the 
Copyright Office’s call for commentary on the DMCA. See The Register’s Perspective on 
Copyright Review: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 24 (Apr. 
29, 2015) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, U.S. Register of Copyrights and Director of the 
U.S. Copyright Office). 
 
23 Notably, this study was conducted prior to the technical amendments to the U.S. 
Copyright Office’s regulations governing the submission of designated agent and service 
provider information to the Office. See Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of 
Claimed Infringement, 82 Fed. Reg. 21696 (May 10, 2017) (amending 37 C.F.R. §§ 201–
202). More on this issue infra, Part III.A. 
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II.  STUDY DESIGN 
 
  A. Higher Education’s DMCA Agents 
 
[10] In order to comprehensively study higher education’s use of the 
DMCA’s protections, we first had to define the universe of higher 
education. To do so, we collected a list of all four-year colleges and 
universities in the United States, using U.S. News & World Report as our 
source. This list totaled 1,337 schools. For each school, we identified its 
precise location (city and state), its general geographic region (Northeast, 
Midwest, South, and West),24 its ranking on U.S. News’s 2017 National 
Liberal Arts or National University college lists (as a rough proxy for 
prestige of the institution), the total student population of the school,25 and 
whether the school is public or private. 
 
[11] We then determined whether each school had registered an agent for 
receipt of DMCA notices. To do so, we consulted the U.S. Copyright 
Office’s directory for such agents (found at 
http://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp/list), which is searchable alphabetically 
by name of the OSP. If we were able to find a registered agent for a school, 
we recorded the agent’s email address and whether the agent’s listed title 
fell within one of the following categories: Library, Information Services, 
General Counsel, Administrator, or Other. (We also took note of those 
schools that did not have a designated agent filed with the Copyright Office. 
As we will see, this data point was one of the most revealing and surprising 
in the entire study.)26 
                                               
24 For this metric, we used the Census Bureau’s regional designations. See Census Regions 
and Divisions of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QHU9-TPJV]. 
 
25 See U.S. News & World Report Best Colleges Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 
(2018), https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges [https://perma.cc/WX9M-432H] 
(reporting each institution’s total enrollment). 
 
26 See Directory of Service Provider Agents for Notification of Claims of Infringement, 
LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp/list/ [https://perma.cc/NK5V-
N5G8]. To test the reliability of searching and finding these DMCA agent registrations, as 
well as our category codings, we both coded one hundred of the agent registrations and 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                             Volume XXV, Issue 2 
 
 7 
[12] The resulting list of DMCA agents all received our survey. Because 
the survey was asking questions relevant to the DMCA, we made the 
assumption that such agents were likely to be knowledgeable, or to know 
who at the institution was knowledgeable, about the school’s interaction 
with the DMCA safe harbor provisions and its corresponding copyright 
policies. 
 
  B.  Design of Survey Instrument 
 
[13] We then created a survey instrument, totaling at most twelve 
questions,27 to send to the collected DMCA agent email addresses. The 
survey, which is reproduced in full in Appendix A to this paper, asks three 
general sets of questions. 
 
[14] The first section, after asking the participant to identify the part of 
the institution in which he or she works, focuses on the institution’s 
handling of notices alleging use of its network, by students or employees, 
to infringe copyrights. Specifically, participants were asked about the 
number of such notices per year (if any), the number of individuals at the 
institution that are involved in handling these notices, and the amount of 
time spent handling each notice. There were four questions in this section. 
 
[15] The second section explored the participant’s understanding of an 
institution’s legal obligations under copyright law. Three scenarios, 
presented in random order, posed scenarios that corresponded to three of 
the four safe harbors under 17 U.S.C. § 512. The survey presented a 
                                               
selected Cohen’s Kappa as the measure of intercoder agreement. See Mark A. Hall & 
Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 
113–14 (2008) (explaining that the best practice for measuring and quantifying the 
reliability of intercoder agreement is to use a coefficient such as Cohen’s Kappa, which 
measures the reliability of agreement between coders and controls for agreement that 
occurs purely by chance). Cohen’s Kappa ranges from 0 to 1, with numbers near 1 
indicating a higher degree of reliability. See id. Our Cohen’s Kappa for the DMCA agent 
registration information for higher education institutions was 1, which equates to “perfect 
agreement.” Id. 
 
27 As one can see from the Appendix, infra, whether a participant was presented with a 
given question sometimes depended on how he or she answered an earlier question—but 
the maximum possible was twelve. 
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Transitory Communications scenario under section 512(a) (downloading 
infringing copies via the school’s network), a System Storage scenario 
under section 512(c) (storing infringing copies on the school’s network), 
and an Information Location scenario under section 512(d) (using the 
school’s network to help others find infringing copies).28 For each scenario, 
we asked whether the participant would think he or she would have had a 
legal obligation to take action. For those participants who had earlier 
indicated that they had received DMCA notices, we also asked what 
percentage of those notices corresponded to each scenario. This section 
comprised three to six questions. 
 
[16] The third section of the survey asked some broader questions about 
each institution’s response to copyright infringement and the reasons behind 
the response. We asked which technology-based deterrents (if any) the 
institution had adopted to inhibit or prohibit use of its network to infringe 
copyrights. We also asked each institution to rank in order of importance 
the factors that motivated its response to notices of copyright 
infringement—e.g., limiting legal liability, educating students, and 
facilitating the free flow of ideas and information. This section included two 
questions. 
 
[17] The survey concluded with an open-ended request for additional 
thoughts and invited participants to indicate whether they were willing to 
be interviewed further. 
 
  C.  Survey Implementation 
 
[18] We tested initial drafts of the survey on various higher education 
administrators that have been involved with copyright law compliance and 
the handling of DMCA notices. These individuals included experts in 
information technology, university librarians, and university general 
counsels. We received feedback on our initial drafts and made necessary 
modifications to improve the instrument. We also applied for and received 
approval from our university’s Institutional Review Board. 
 
                                               
28 We did not pose a scenario involving Cached Copies under the remaining safe harbor, 
section 512(b), since that conduct had not arisen as a concern of OSPs or copyright owners. 
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[19] We then sent a link to the survey to the email address for each 
registered DMCA agent. We used Qualtrics to distribute the survey and 
track responses. The distributed links were unique for each institution, 
allowing us to associate the information we collected earlier (e.g., size and 
location of school) with each response. The email noted that the responses 
were completely confidential and would be anonymized and aggregated 
with the responses of others. The email also invited participants to feel free 
to forward the survey to those who may be more knowledgeable about their 
institution’s copyright practices. We also suggested that participants refer 
to whatever personnel or materials at their institution would help them 
answer the survey’s questions. 
 
[20] We followed up this initial email with two reminder emails, spaced 
roughly one month apart, in order to maximize participation. 
 
III.  RESULTS 
 
  A. Registration Information 
 
[21] At the outset of our research, we discovered that over half of all four-
year colleges and universities do not have a registered DMCA agent. We 
identified a total of 1,377 such institutions nationwide, of which 697 
(50.62%) had no registered agent with the Copyright Office. Of the 
remaining 680 (49.38%) that did register agents, our survey email bounced 
back in 89 (13.09%) cases. This meant that of the 1,377 colleges, 786 
(57.08%) either did not have a registered agent or the registered email was 
no longer working. 
 
[22] We then looked at the DMCA agent registration data more closely. 
First, we classified the data based on whether the college was public or 
private. As seen in Figure 1, a greater percentage of public colleges had 
registered their agents than private colleges. 
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[23] We also compared the registration data to the institution’s student 
population, with results reported in Figure 2. Notably, larger institutions are 
more likely to have registered a DMCA agent—except for the largest 
institutions (those with 15,000 students or more). 
 
[24] We then examined whether institutions ranked high by U.S. News 
& World Report (U.S. News) were more likely to register a DMCA agent. 
We identified the institutions that U.S. News ranked in the top 50 on either 
its National Universities list or Liberal Arts Universities list. Out of those 
100 institutions, only 9 (9%) failed to register a DMCA agent. Of the 91 
registered, 14 (15.38%) listed email addresses that bounced. This compares 
to 688 (53.88%) of the other 1,277 institutions that failed to register and 75 
(12.73%) of those registered whose email addresses bounced. 
365 315
543 154
0%20%
40%60%
80%100%
Private Public
Figure	1:		DMCA	Registration
for	Public	and	Private	Colleges
Agent	Registered No	Registration
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[25] From the registrations, we were also able to observe the title of the 
identified agent. The data is reproduced in Figure 3, with a majority 
(59.11%, 402) in information services. 
 
 
48 321 133
50 128
146 382 63
12 94
0%20%
40%60%
80%100%
Fewer	than1000 1000	to5000 5000	to10000 10000	to15000 15000+
Figure	2:	DMCA	Registration
by	Student	Population
Agent	Registered No	Registration
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  B.  Information from Survey 
 
[26] The following discussion summarizes the survey results. Note that 
we have made the raw, anonymized data from the survey available online 
at copyrightlawdata.com. 
 
  1.  Response Rate and Respondent Descriptives 
 
[27] As previously mentioned, 680 colleges and universities had 
registered DMCA agents. In a few instances, usually involving large public 
institutions with several campuses, multiple institutions used the same, 
single agent registration. In those instances, we sent a single survey to the 
relevant email address. This meant that we sent out a total of 634 survey 
requests for the 680 registered institutions. 
 
[28] Of these 634 survey requests, 92 emails bounced (as discussed 
Admin20%	(135)
General	Counsel10%	(69)Information	Services59%	(402)
Library6%	(44)
Other5%	(31)
Figure	3:		Category	of
Registered	DMCA	Agent
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above) and 8 opted out of the survey,29 for a total of 15.77% (100) that were 
unable to take the survey. Of the remaining 534 that received the email, 
14.42% (77) fully completed the survey, and 16 more completed part of it. 
Of those 16, three provided an answer beyond the first question, which 
asked the participant to identify his or her position within the institution. 
Thus, 14.98% (80 of the 534) who received emails participated in the survey 
in a meaningful way. Two of those who responded were agents for more 
than one related institution; we coded those as a single response, combining 
the enrollment numbers for the related institutions. 
 
[29] Of the respondents, 51.25% (41) were from private schools and 
48.75% (39) were from public. The student population of the responding 
institutions varied: 
 
• 2.5% (2) had fewer than 1,000 students; 
• 43.75% (35) had between 1,001 and 5,000 students; 
• 16.25% (13) had between 5,001 and 10,000 students; 
• 5% (4) had between 10,001 and 15,000 students; and 
• 32.5% (26) institutions had more than 15,000 students. 
 
Notably, this distribution of characteristics amongst our respondents is both 
varied and mimics the distribution in the complete set of schools 
investigated. 
 
[30] Many of the respondents (70%, 56), were housed in the information 
technology department of their institution. The next largest category was 
library (15%, 12), with three in the legal/general counsel’s office and three 
in student affairs.30 
 
                                               
29 Qualtrics gives potential participants the option to “opt-out” of the survey by clicking a 
link separate from the survey link. See Email Survey Invitations, QUALTRICS (2018), 
https://www.qualtrics.com/support/survey-platform/distributions-module/email-
distribution/emails-overview/#UsingTheOptOutLink [https://perma.cc/EYX7-JHVH] 
(providing instructions for participants in relation to email surveys). Eight schools did just 
that with our survey. 
 
30 Six were in “other.” 
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 2.  Data on DMCA Notices and Response Structure 
 
[31] The approximate number of DMCA notices received per year varied 
greatly, from a low of zero to a high of 2,000, with a mean of 200.79.31 The 
basic statistics are reported in Table 1 below, which both provides the raw 
numbers and then puts them in perspective by showing the number of 
notices per enrolled student. 
 
Table 1: Volume of DMCA Notices (n = 79) 
  
 Median Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Notices/Year 30 200.79 329.35 0 2000 
Notices/Year/Student 0.0128 0.02 0.04 0 0.32 
 
[32] The distribution of notices, and notices per student, is skewed to the 
right, with 72.5% (58) schools clustering between zero to 270 notices 
(Figure 4) and 78.75% (63) schools clustering between zero and 0.034 
notices per student (Figure 5). 
 
                                               
31 The 2,000 figure was an outlier; the second-highest figure was 1,000. 
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[33] Public schools received, on average, more notices (283.34 mean) 
than private schools (122.38 mean). However, this may be a function of a 
higher student population in public schools, as both categories received a 
similar number of notices per student: public schools received an average 
of 0.0215 notices per student, compared to 0.0238 for private schools. 
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[34] Regarding the number of people within the institution involved in 
handling responses to DMCA notices, we again saw a wide variance. Table 
2 sets forth both the basic statistics and the per-enrolled-student breakdown, 
and Figure 6 shows once again a distribution skewed to the right, with 
38.88% (31) schools clustering between 1 and 2 individuals and 92.5% (74) 
schools having 5 or less.32 
 
Table 2: Number of Individuals Involved in DMCA Response  
(n = 79) 
 
Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
No. Individuals 3 3.43 3.98 1 35 
No. Individuals 
 per Student 0.0005 0.00083 0.001 0.00006 0.00534 
 
                                               
32 The highest number of individuals reported, 35, was an outlier; the second-highest figure 
was 10. 
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[35] Regarding the amount of time spent on each notice, institutional 
responses again varied.  Table 3 shows the median, mean, and standard 
deviation for the response time, and Figure 7 shows a skewed-to-right 
clustering of 65% (52) schools between zero and 1 hours.33 
 
Table 3: Hours Spent per DMCA Response (n = 78) 
 
 Median Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Hours/notice 1 2.06 7.07 0 62.4 
 
                                               
33 The highest number of hours reported, 62.4, was an outlier; the second-highest figure 
was 8. 
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[36] We also multiplied the average number of hours per notice by the 
number of notices institutions averaged per year. This data is reported in 
Table 4 below. 62% (50) of the institutions reporting spending 50 hours or 
less a year handling DMCA notices. Notably, 12.5% (10) of the institutions 
spent 500 or more hours a year on DMCA notices, with 5 institutions 
spending 1,000 hours or more a year. 
 
Table 4: Total Hours Spent per Year on DMCA Response (n = 78) 
 
 Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total 
Hours  30 658.81 4296.85 0 37252.8 
 
3.  Participant Views on Legal Obligations 
 
[37] The three hypothetical scenarios tested the participants’ 
understanding of whether they had a legal obligation to take any action in 
response to a notice from a copyright owner. Scenario 1 hypothesized a 
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student’s use of the school’s network to illegally download copyrighted 
material onto the student’s own laptop computer—a situation that falls 
within the Transitory Communications safe harbor of 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
Scenario 2 hypothesized a student’s use of the school’s network to illegally 
store copyrighted material, such as on a website that resides on the school’s 
servers—a situation that falls within the System Storage safe harbor of 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c). And Scenario 3 hypothesized a student’s use of the 
school’s network to help others find infringing materials, as by maintaining 
a website with hyperlinks to copyrighted material for illegal download—a 
situation that falls within the Information Location safe harbor of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(d). 
 
[38] As Table 5 shows, Scenario 1 garnered the most Yes answers and 
Scenario 3 the least, but a strong majority of participants thought that they 
had a legal obligation to take action in all three. 
 
Table 5: Participant Views on Legal Obligations 
 
 Yes No n 
Scenario 1 — 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) 
(Transitory Communications) 
91.89% 
(68) 
8.11% 
(6) 74 
Scenario 2 — 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) 
(System Storage) 
76.71% 
(56) 
23.29% 
(17) 73 
Scenario 3 — 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) 
(Information Location) 
62.16% 
(46) 
37.84% 
(28) 74 
 
[39] Similarly, participants reported that Scenario 1 occurred most often 
at their institutions, with Scenario 3 occurring the least (Table 6). But here 
the difference between the scenarios was much more marked, with Scenario 
1 accounting for two thirds of notices received, on average, versus single-
digit percentages for the other two scenarios.34 
                                               
34 Because the three scenarios did not necessarily capture all possible notices that schools 
might receive from copyright owners, and because a single notice might implicate more 
than one scenario, the survey instrument did not require the three percentages to total 
100%. Note also that, although we call them Scenario 1, Scenario 2, and Scenario 3, the 
order in which they were presented was randomized for each survey participant. 
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Table 6: Occurrence of Scenarios (n = 64) 
  
Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Scenario 1 — 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(a) 
(Transitory 
Communications) 
97.50% 67.64% 30.85 
Scenario 2 — 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c) 
(System Storage) 
0.00% 4.02% 13.29 
Scenario 3 — 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(d) 
(Information Location) 
0.00% 3.19% 15.94 
 
   4.  Responses to Copyright Infringement 
 
[40] Participants in the survey largely reported that their institutions used 
technology-based deterrents to inhibit the use of their institutions’ networks 
to infringe copyright. As Table 7 shows, a wide variety of such deterrents 
are used, and almost all respondent schools reported using at least one. 
 
Table 7: Use of Technology-Based Deterrents (n = 72) 
  
Schools Using Deterrent 
User network registration/login 75.00% (54) 
Port banning/firewalls 56.94% (41) 
Traffic/packet shaping 54.17% (39) 
Bandwidth throttling 41.67% (30) 
Traffic monitoring 36.11% (26) 
Other 8.33% (6) 
None 5.56% (4) 
 
In addition, a number of participants commented that use of technology-
based deterrents (particularly port banning and packet shaping) had reduced 
the incidence of DMCA notices. 
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[41] Most schools used at least two different technological-based 
deterrents, with over half of the schools using three or more different 
technological measures. The distribution of the number of different 
technological-based deterrents used is shown below in Figure 8. 
 
[42] Finally, participants were asked to provide information on the 
motivations for their schools’ handling of copyright notices. A list of five 
possible motivations was offered, plus a sixth “Other” category. The 
participants were asked to rank them in order of importance (with 1 being 
the most important) and were allowed not to rank a factor if it was not in 
fact a motivation. Table 8 shows the results. 
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Table 8: Motivations for Policy on Copyright Notices 
  
Importance of 
Motivation 
(scale of 1 to 6) n 
Limiting the institution’s 
exposure to legal liability 2.10 67 
Educating students 2.45 62 
Facilitating the free flow 
of ideas and information 3.25 55 
Limiting demands on the 
institution’s information 
technology resources 
3.53 60 
Disciplining students 4.31 61 
Other 3.25 4 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. Agent Registration Issues 
 
[43] The study initially revealed how many institutions of higher 
education have not registered a DMCA agent, and thus are not protected by 
three of the four section 512 safe harbors.35 Of the 1,377 institutions studied, 
more than half had no DMCA agent registration (50.62% unregistered). 
This percentage of unregistered schools was higher for private institutions 
(59.8% unregistered), which suggests that the explanation is not the 
sovereign immunity that public institutions enjoy in copyright suits.36 It was 
also high for both the smallest, institutions with less than 1,000 students 
(75.26% unregistered), and, perhaps surprisingly, the largest institutions—
                                               
35 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012) (indicating that only the Transitory Communications 
safe harbor does not require registration of an agent).  
 
36 See Coyle v. Univ. of Kentucky, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1017 (E.D. Ky. 2014). 
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those with 15,000 or more students (42.34% unregistered). Maybe these 
unregistered institutions are not providing any online services to their 
students and employees, and thus do not need the protection of the relevant 
safe harbors, but that is highly unlikely. 
 
[44] In addition, even for those schools that had registered, there is 
evidence that the registrations are not current. The Copyright Office 
regulations provide a mechanism for updating the DMCA agent registration 
information.37 And to stay within the relevant safe harbors, the registration 
information must provide sufficient information so that the designated agent 
may be efficiently contacted.38 However, of the 49.38% registered, 13.09% 
listed emails bounced back when sending the survey, meaning they were 
not correct or operational. We also received a few emails from the listed 
DMCA agents indicating that the emailed individual no longer worked on 
the identified institution. There is also reason to believe that a portion—
perhaps a significant portion—of those who did not even click the survey 
link failed to do so because the registered email address was not 
operational.39 
 
[45] Finally, when collecting the DMCA agent information, we 
encountered many barriers to obtaining the listings. Whether an OSP has 
registered was not universally searchable, only searchable within the 
                                               
37 See 37 C.F.R. § 201.38(f) (2015); see also 37 C.F.R. § 201.38(c)(3) (2018) (stating that 
the “name of the agent designated to receive notification of claimed infringement” must be 
identified). Note that the relevant regulation has been revised since the study was 
conducted, but both the original and the revision provide for updates to registration 
information. 
 
38 See, e.g., Disney Enters. v. Hotfile, No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 6336286, at 
*25 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). 
 
39 To minimize spam, many institutions do not bounce invalid email addresses, instead 
opting to silently drop the email message. Notably, this fact may indicate that the survey’s 
response rate is much higher, with many of the potential participants never getting the 
survey because the email address was no longer valid. See, e.g., Yuchun Tang et al., 
Support Vector Machines and Random Forests Modeling for Spam Senders Behavior 
Analysis, IEEE XPLORE 1, 4 (Dec. 8, 2008), 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4698194/metrics#metrics [https://perma.cc/RV8A-
E6S2] (noting the silently dropping email message method of quarantining potential 
“spam”). 
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alphabetical letter that begins the OSP’s name. In addition, the individual 
registrations were simply scans of the submitted paper registrations, without 
text recognition, which made the information in the forms not searchable. 
Additionally, individual registrations were hard to read—with many scans 
being blurry and some registrations being hand-written and illegible. If we 
encountered these problems in gathering the data for our survey, it is safe 
to assume that those who used the system for its intended purpose 
encountered them as well. 
 
[46] In sum, these data and observations confirm earlier U.S. Copyright 
Office findings40 that the DMCA agent registration system is simply 
underused and, when used, is not adequately accessible or up to date. When 
more than half of four-year institutions lack a registered agent with a 
functioning email address, that hurts both schools and copyright owners: in 
the absence of an agent, the former cannot receive the benefit of three of the 
four safe harbors, and the latter are denied a streamlined way to initiate a 
takedown when they see their content being hosted or linked on a school’s 
network. 
 
[47] Some of these infirmities in agent registration have their root in the 
fact that when we conducted the study, the Copyright Office was still 
operating under interim regulations to govern the DMCA agent registration 
process.41 The interim regulations were published in 1998 with the intent to 
ultimately replace them with permanent regulations,42 but instead they 
remained active for almost two decades. Finally, in late 2016, the Copyright 
Office implemented a new agent registration system, requiring OSPs to 
comply with it by the end of 2017.43 
                                               
40 See Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement, 76 Fed. Reg. 
59,953 (Sept. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (noting that a “small random 
sampling of a portion of the current directory reveals that a number of existing designations 
are associated with businesses that have ceased operations”). 
 
41 See Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement, 63 Fed. Reg. 
59,233 (Nov. 3, 1998) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (noting that these were interim 
regulations). 
 
42 See id. 
 
43 See Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement, 37 C.F.R. § 
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[48] The new system should solve a few of the problems our study 
revealed. Going forward, registrations will be universally searchable, and 
the results of the search will no longer be in the form of scanned, 
handwritten PDFs.44 The routine identification of registered DMCA agents 
should accordingly be less costly.  
 
[49] But the new system does nothing about the marked absence of 
registrations in the first place. Registering an agent has always been easy; 
indeed, if anything, it was easier under the old interim guidelines, under 
which a registration was perpetual; in contrast, the new system requires each 
OSP to renew its registration every three years.45 The disappearance of the 
interim guidelines will do nothing to increase registration by the half of 
higher education institutions who currently lack an agent. 
 
[50] The explanation for the absence of registrations is unknown. One 
possibility, which we plan to explore in further research, is that the 
unregistered schools are acting rationally—i.e., that the benefits of the 
DMCA are not worth the costs.46 We urge the Copyright Office and other 
scholars to research the issue as well. In addition, the Copyright Office 
should consider launching an affirmative educational program regarding the 
DMCA safe harbors, aimed at institutions of higher education. Such 
institutions have understandably been in the copyright crosshairs of both 
Congress and the owners of copyrighted works. Their failure to take even 
the first step toward complying with the statute that governs their conduct 
merits further inquiry. 
 
 
                                               
201.38 (2018). 
 
44 See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SEARCH THE DMCA DESIGNATED AGENT 
DIRECTORY, https://dmca.copyright.gov/osp/ [https://perma.cc/22TC-LDZB]. 
 
45 See 37 C.F.R. § 201.38(c)(4) (2017). 
 
46 See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Convergence and Conflation in Online 
Copyright 36 (Aug. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3233113 [https://perma.cc/K4HN-
T4CV]. 
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  B. Distinguishing the Safe Harbors 
 
[51] The most revealing part of the survey results is the response to the 
three scenarios, and in particular Scenario 1. That scenario read as follows: 
 
If you were to receive a notice alleging the following scenario, 
would you think you had a legal obligation to take action? 
 
A student or employee is using the institution’s network to 
download material that infringes copyright from the Internet to his 
or her own computer (or to upload such material from his or her own 
computer). 
  
Example: A student uses a file-sharing program to download 
a song from a third-party website to her laptop, using your 
institution’s Internet connection. 
 
Because the institution’s network is merely acting as a conduit, and the 
infringing copy resides on the student’s own computer, this scenario clearly 
falls within the Transitory Communications safe harbor of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(a). It does not implicate the System Storage safe harbor of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c) because the infringing material does not reside on a system 
controlled by the institution; it only passes through.47 
                                               
47 It is worth mentioning that several courts have drawn this exact distinction in cases 
involving institutions of higher learning that were accused of providing Internet 
connectivity (but not storage space) to infringers. The cases originated in a different 
DMCA provision, 17 U.S.C. § 512(h), which authorizes the issuance of subpoenas to OSPs 
that engaged in System Storage but not to those that engaged only in Transitory 
Communications. The courts accordingly addressed the very issue that Scenario 1 tested—
i.e., which safe harbor applies to students who use a school’s network to download 
copyrighted content to (or upload copyrighted content from) their personal computers—
and found that the answer was section 512(a). See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. 
Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 367 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950 & n.4 (M.D. N.C. 2005) 
(distinguishing between giving students network storage space to maintain websites, which 
would implicate section 512(c), and providing students with “conduit” connectivity that 
they use to upload content from their personal computers to third parties on the Internet, 
which would implicate section 512(a)); Interscope Records v. Doe, 494 F. Supp. 2d 388, 
389–91 (E.D. Va. 2007) (making the same distinction regarding a college that provided 
Internet connectivity that was used to access “P2P systems [that] allow[ed] users to 
disseminate files stored on their computers to other internet users”); see also Recording 
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[52] The distinction between the Transitory Communications safe harbor 
and the System Storage safe harbor is important—because of the two, only 
the latter requires that schools implement a notice-and-takedown 
procedure. In other words, an OSP is insulated from liability for providing 
network connectivity regardless of whether it responds to notices or even 
designates a DMCA agent at all. Yet 91.89% of survey participants reported 
having “a legal obligation to take action” if notified of the situation 
described in Scenario 1. (See Table 5.) That figure far exceeds the 
percentage who reported having a legal obligation to take action when 
presented with a System Storage situation in Scenario 2 (76.71%) or an 
Information Location situation in Scenario 3 (62.16%)—both of which 
actually require notice-and-takedown as part of the safe harbor. 
 
[53] On average, Scenario 1 situations accounted for 67.64% of notices 
that schools received (see Table 6), so this misunderstanding has significant 
consequences. Moreover, schools reported that “limiting the institution’s 
exposure to legal liability” was the most important aggregate motivation for 
their DMCA policies (see Table 8), so a proper understanding of the law is 
important. 
 
[54] Might there be other explanations for these results, aside from a 
misunderstanding of the safe-harbor structure? Possible, but unlikely. 
Consider the alternative explanations: 
 
• “Legal obligation.” We asked schools about whether they had a 
“legal obligation” to take action. To be precise, section 512 
imposes no affirmative obligation; its safe harbors merely give 
OSPs a legal defense that they would not otherwise have.48 To the 
extent that participants made this distinction, however, they would 
have answered No, not Yes, to Scenario 1—which means that a 
                                               
Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233–34 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(quashing subpoena to commercial ISP because its provision of Internet connectivity to 
file-sharers conduct fell within section 512(a) rather than section 512(c) or (d)). 
 
48 When designing the survey, we consider posing the question differently, but making it 
100% legally accurate would have involved so many caveats and conditions that it would 
have been much less comprehensible to the non-lawyer respondent. 
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more accurate phrasing would have resulted in a figure even higher 
than 91.89%. 
 
• “Take action.” Another potential phrasing issue involves the term 
“take action” in our scenario questions. Some schools might have 
interpreted the phrase broadly. For example, section 512(i) requires 
OSPs to implement a policy of terminating users who repeatedly 
infringe copyright; arguably, this includes keeping a tally of those 
users who infringe using the network as a conduit, which could be 
seen as “taking action.” If that is the case, a Yes answer to Scenario 
1 would not necessarily imply a misunderstanding of the law. That 
possibility is fairly attenuated, however, and would probably 
reduce the 91.89% figure by only a small amount. 
 
• Combination of safe harbors. It some instances, a user might use 
both connectivity and network storage space, as when an employee 
downloads infringing content to a university server. In that case, 
both the Transitory Communications and the System Storage safe 
harbors would apply. That possibility might cast some doubt on our 
measurement of the volume of notices represented by each scenario 
(see Table 6), to the extent that participants thought that each notice 
had to be classified under a single scenario.49 But the individual 
scenarios did not present facts consistent with multiple safe 
harbors, so this possibility should not have affected their 
understanding of the safe harbors themselves. 
 
• Voluntary student discipline. Schools may be aware that they can 
stay within the Transitory Communications safe harbor without 
implementing notice-and-takedown, but they respond to such 
notices anyway because they want to discipline students who 
infringe. If so, it would be odd to report that they had a “legal 
obligation” to respond—and student discipline ranks last on the list 
of institutions’ motivations (see Table 8). 
 
                                               
49 As already mentioned, however, the survey instrument did not require the percentages 
that a participant reported to total 100%. So, if they received notices that addressed more 
than one scenario, they were free to count it in the tally for each. 
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• Selection bias. Those schools that chose to participate in the survey 
might not be representative of all schools since the survey was sent 
to only those schools with designated agents. However, the 
response within this cohort was necessarily random. Also, if 
selection bias were present, it would not explain the problem away, 
but merely reduce its scale. 
 
[55] In the end, then, our survey results provide strong evidence that 
institutions of higher learning are overcomplying with regard to Transitory 
Communications, but arguably undercomplying with regard to System 
Storage and Information Location. Motivated more by a fear of legal 
liability than by any educational or disciplinary goal, schools consistently 
respond to the most frequent category of notices that copyright owners 
send—even though doing so has no effect on their legal liability. 
 
[56] As with agent registration, this finding calls for both more 
investigation and more education. Even those colleges and universities who 
register an agent nonetheless mismanage some of the most important and 
most frequent interactions with the safe harbor system. And there is no 
reason to assume that these issues are limited to OSPs in higher education. 
The largest and most successful online platforms, such as YouTube and 
Facebook, undoubtedly have a deep and accurate understanding of the 
workings of the DMCA. But there are thousands of other providers of online 
services who are of the same size and sophistication as colleges and 
universities. Discovering whether they exhibit similar tendencies and 
interrogating the underlying (mis)understandings of the law should 
contribute to the improved administration of copyright law in the online 
world. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[57] For more than two decades, a battle has been fought over the rights 
and responsibilities of those whose online services involve copyrighted 
materials. In many ways, higher education represents the crucible of this 
conflict. Yet the data demonstrates that the statute Congress enacted to 
mediate the conflict is going unused by institutions of higher education—
and, when it is used, is it is being used poorly. These findings suggest there 
is more research, education, and reform to be done both within higher 
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education and beyond before the conflict has any hope of a sensible 
resolution. 
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APPENDIX: SURVEY INSTRUMENT50 
 
Q1. Which of the following most closely describes the part of your 
institution in which you work? 
m Information Technology (1) 
m Legal / General Counsel’s Office (2) 
m Student Affairs (3) 
m Library (4) 
m Other: (5) ____________________ 
 
 
 
Q2. As you know, copyright owners and their agents sometimes send 
notices to institutions of higher learning, claiming that students or 
employees are using the institutions’ networks to infringe copyright. Such 
notices often include requests for the institution to take some action with 
regard to the alleged infringement. Approximately how many such notices 
per year does your institution typically receive? Please use the last five years 
as a reference. 
 
[If answer to Q2 is zero, skip to Q5.] 
 
 
 
Q3. Institutions of higher learning respond to these notices in a variety of 
ways, including verifying the claim, corresponding with the claimant, 
taking down copyrighted materials, interacting with students and 
employees, and so forth. How many different individuals at your institution 
are routinely involved in such responses? 
 
 
 
Q4. On average, how much total time do you and others at your institution 
spend on such responses? (Please indicate average number of hours per 
                                               
50 Note that the numbering of questions in the instrument tracks the automated system that 
Qualtrics uses and can therefore be somewhat counterintuitive. 
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notice. For fractions of an hour, use decimals—e.g., 0.5.) 
 
You will now be presented with three scenarios involving such notices. Feel 
free to use the buttons at the bottom of the page to navigate among the 
scenarios until you are satisfied with your answers.51 
 
 
 
Q5. If you were to receive a notice alleging the following scenario, would 
you think you had a legal obligation to take action? 
 
Scenario: A student or employee is using the institution’s network 
to download material that infringes copyright from the Internet to 
his or her own computer (or to upload such material from his or her 
own computer). 
 
Example: A student uses a file-sharing program to download a song 
from a third-party website to her laptop, using your institution’s 
Internet connection. 
m Yes (1) 
m No (2) 
 
[If answer to Q5 is zero, skip to Q7.] 
 
 
 
Q6. Of the notices that you receive, approximately what percentage allege 
conduct like that in the foregoing scenario? 
 
 
  
                                               
51 Note that the order in which the three scenarios were presented was randomized for each 
participant. 
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Q7. If you were to receive a notice alleging the following scenario, would 
you think you had a legal obligation to take action? 
 
Scenario: A student or employee is storing material that infringes 
copyright on the institution’s network. 
 
Example: A student is allocated a certain amount of storage space 
on a server controlled by your institution, and he uses it to store 
movie files. 
m Yes (1) 
m No (2) 
 
[If answer to Q7 is zero, skip to Q9.] 
 
 
 
Q8. Of the notices that you receive, approximately what percentage allege 
conduct like that in the foregoing scenario? 
 
 
 
Q9. If you were to receive a notice alleging the following scenario, would 
you think you had a legal obligation to take action? 
 
Scenario: A student or employee is using the institution’s network 
to help others find material that infringes copyright. 
 
Example: A student is allowed to maintain a website or blog on a 
server controlled by your institution, and she uses it to maintain a 
list of hyperlinks to copyrighted material for illegal download. 
m Yes (1) 
m No (2) 
 
[If answer to Q9 is zero, skip to Q11.] 
 
 
 
Q10. Of the notices that you receive, approximately what percentage allege 
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conduct like that in the foregoing scenario? 
 
 
 
Q11. Have you used any of the following technology-based deterrents to 
inhibit or prevent the sort of scenarios listed above? (Choose all that apply, 
including those used in the past. Feel free to ask others at your institution if 
you need to.) 
q Port banning/firewalls (1) 
q Bandwidth throttling (3) 
q Traffic/packet shaping (4) 
q Traffic monitoring (5) 
q User network registration/login (9) 
q Other: (6) ____________________ 
q We have not used any technology-based deterrents. (11) 
 
 
 
Q12. An institution’s policy regarding copyright notices may be motivated 
by a number of different factors. The following list contains examples of 
such factors. Please rank the factors according to their importance to your 
institution (with 1 being most important) to the best of your knowledge. If 
a factor is not at all important to your institution, do not rank it. 
_ Limiting the institution’s exposure to legal liability. (1) 
_ Limiting demands on the institution’s information technology 
resources. (2) 
_ Educating students. (3) 
_ Disciplining students. (4) 
_ Facilitating the free flow of ideas and information. (5) 
_ Other: (6) 
 
 
 
Q13. If you have any other thoughts or information to share on these 
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matters, please use the following space to provide them. 
 
 
 
Q14. If you are willing to participate in a follow-up interview, please enter 
your email address below. 
 
 
 
This marks the end of the survey. Please use the back button below if you 
need to revisit your answers to any of the questions. If you are finished, 
please use the forward button to complete the survey. Once you hit the 
forward button, you will not be able to change any of your previous answers. 
 
